The focus of this article is to investigate how Latino Americans have been historically racialized in popular culture, key state legislative iniatives, and jurors' death sentencing decisions. While the bulk of the literature on the death penalty and criminal punishment more broadly focuses on racial disparities in sentencing outcomes, far less is know about how the sentencing process is itself racialized. Drawing on the stories of former jurors who served in death penalty cases involving Latino American defendants, we argue that such agents of the state are racially disciplined to punish in capital murder trials. Finally, we comment on directions for a more culturally-centered study of penal action.
the popular media. Next we provide an analysis of jurors' stories in cases involving the imposition of the death penalty on Latino defendants. Finally, we discuss our findings and present conclusions.
THE RACIALIZED DISCIPLINE TO PUNISH
Michel Foucault is one of the most important and influential theorists dealing with issues of power and punishment in society. However, Foucault's work in the area of race relations is less well known. An analysis of how power operates in society is undoubtedly critical to understand the dynamics of a penal system, yet an examination of race relations is equally important when a system of justice produces racial/ethnic disparities as its outcomes. Fortunately, one of Foucault's (2002) last writings before his death that dealt with these issues has recently been translated into English. Here, Foucault touches upon issues of power, punishment, and, for the first time, race. In our study, we draw on this work for the analysis of jurors' discourse in the sentencing of Latino defendants to death.
In Society must be defended, Foucault (2002: 254) asks: 'How . . . is it possible for a political power to kill. . . . How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system?'. For Foucault, the answer is racism, which, along with disciplinary (Foucault, 1979) and regulatory (Foucault 1991: 87-104 ) methods, was inscribed in the mechanisms of the State. 2 As Foucault (2002: 258) explains:
From this perspective, an exploration of public opinion about race and capital punishment in the abstract (i.e., mentalities, ideologies, or 'the lies of power') would provide little insight into how the death sentence in practice is actually made racist. Indeed, by elucidating how the mechanisms of disciplinary power infiltrate penal practices, Foucault has already liberated us from conceiving of the outcomes of justice, including capital sentences, as the sole result of state sovereignty. It is in the workings of disciplinary apparatuses that we must seek for the subtle mechanisms of exclusion that 'kill' or 'let die' the Latino/a body.
From this perspective, disciplinary power, through a 'color blind' discourse, normalizes practices that subject Latino/a offenders to a non-egalitarian system of governance. 3 Following Foucault's conceptualization of power, we do not look for racist/ethnocentric penal practices as overt manifestations of the 'will of the sovereign'. Instead, we examine in jurors' sentencing narratives -indeed, the 'capillary' infiltrations of power -for how racially 'disciplined' yet apparently 'enlightened' jurors, by imposing death sentences on Latinos, normalize and reinforce asymmetric racial/ethnic, or better said, racialized relations in society. How are dominant-subordinate -indeed, non-egalitarian -relations perpetuated in jurors' judgments to impose the death sentence?
The present analysis Foucault' s perspective is thus prescient for theorizing about lethal discipline in the context of American racialized penal justice. Given the US's enduring racial and ethnic PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY 6(1) inequality (Omi and Winant, 1986; Oliver and Shapiro, 1996) , it is not surprising that a myriad of studies have documented racial inequity in death sentencing outcomes for decades (for a recent review, see Baldus et al., 1998 ). Yet little is known about how the very process of death sentencing is racialized . 4 In this article, we also argue that to understand how penal discipline is racialized in jurors' stories, the focus must move beyond a unidimensional analysis of the stereotypes 'that (explicitly or implicitly) attribute merits or allocate values to members of racially categorized groups solely because of their 'race' (Omi and Winant, 1986: 145) . More specifically, we argue that to understand racialized discipline in capital sentencing, the focus should be on a second line of inquiry: How does the use of racial stereotypes confirm taken-for-granted, normalized understandings or 'hegemonic tales' (Ewick and Silbey, 1995) ? And how do such historically situated stories embody what 'everyone knows' or does not have to discuss because it goes 'without saying' (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991: 23) ?
NARRATIVES OF THE DEATH SENTENCE
Quite recently death penalty scholarship in the US has taken a cultural turn. 5 Led chiefly by the work of Austin Sarat (e.g., 1998; , such analyses, as opposed to more traditional policy analyses of the death penalty, investigate how broader cultural understandings of prevailing societal values and power relations pervade America's death sentencing protocol in practice. Relying on the narratives of legal actors in the capital sentencing context, these studies provide important background context for the foregoing analysis. Sarat's (1993) study of narratives of violence in capital trials demonstrates the takenfor-grantedness of racialized understandings in prosecutorial discourse. Problematizing the prosecution's argument -'We have a right,' the prosecutor claimed, 'to be vindicated and protected' (emphasis added) -Sarat elucidates how such narrating simultaneously serves to reinforce whiteness as a legally protected, dominant group 'interest': ' We' is both an inclusive and a violent naming, a naming fraught with racial meaning. Who is included in the 'we'? While this 'we' reaches from this world to the next as a remembrance of and identification with [the White victim] , at the same time, it makes the Black [defendant] an outsider in a community that needs protection from people like him. It excludes him by claiming law as an entitlement against him. Law's violence is necessary both to vindicate and protect 'us' from him. (Sarat, 1993: 49) A second case-study of capital jurors' narratives in Georgia (Sarat, 1995) paints a fascinating and complex picture of how violence is inextricably bound up in jurors' representations of their responsibility as deciders of life and death. While Sarat's case study offers no insights into how jurors' narratives are racialized, his study is important for elucidating an alternative way jurors narrate their sentencing decisions as informed by their taken-for-granted beliefs. More specifically, Sarat's study shows how jurors' global beliefs about a 'faulty' US parole system are imported into their sentencing decisions as a kind of 'law' they know 'must be' correct -indeed 'as an expression of frustration at the incompleteness of a sentencing system that [they believe] did not provide life without parole' (Sarat, 1995 (Sarat, : 1135 .
FLEURY-STEINER AND ARGOTHY Lethal 'borders'
A final analysis of capital jurors' narratives by Howarth (1994) is perhaps most germane to the present analysis. Drawing on post-trial interviews with former capital jurors in California, Howarth's analysis elucidates the pervasive gendered character of the jury's sentencing decision. Employing a 'gendered grammar' in the recounting of their experiences, jurors' stories reveal a pervasive hegemonic masculinity. Indeed, they describe their decision as 'reasoned, principled, distanced, and thus objective' (Howarth, 1994 (Howarth, : 1350 . At the same time, Howarth's analysis reveals how such an 'anti-sympathetic' masculinity cannot be harnessed by conventional understandings of gender as a male/female dichotomy. As one female juror, describing her feelings towards more sympathetic jurors, illustrates, 'It isn't that [they're] too tender-hearted; [they're] chicken shit' (Howarth, 1994 (Howarth, : 1363 . If Howarth (1994 Howarth ( : 1350 is correct that capital jurors' 'intellectual systems in fact incorporate both sides of the dichotomies, and much in between, but the "female" side is hidden', might we expect that jurors' sentencing decisions reveal a pervasive, hegemonic racial discourse?
RACIALIZING LATINO/AS IN THE US
The image of Latino/a Americans as 'dangerous' and 'immoral' goes back at least as early as Columbus's voyage to the Greater Antilles in the late 15th Century. Chronicling a series of observations of the New World, Columbus's grossly inaccurate descriptions of early indigenous peoples as 'fierce', 'immoral', and 'cannibalistic', served as important 'seeds for the development of racialized stereotypes' (Castro, 1998: 135) . As Diego O. Castro observes:
Because inhabitants of the Americas were depicted as savages and cannibals, people without morals, culture, or religion, stereotypes could easily be constructed and later effortlessly reconstructed to accommodate a different time period. Thus, contemporary racial stereotypes that depict Latinos as deviant, inferior, violent, lazy, and uncultured (to name but a few) had their foundation established long ago by the imagination of earlier writers who knew little or nothing of what or who they wrote about. (Castro, 1998: 135) The lasting impact of such stereotypes also cannot be overstated in their importance in the colonizing of Latino/as. After the US and Mexican war, America was legally bound by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to both protect Chicano/as property rights on annexed territories and to grant all Latino/as US citizenship. In a word, the US never lived up to its end of the bargain. Congressional actions such as the California Land Act of 1851 reclaimed much of this territory, and violated the treaty by using 'law as a weapon, and joining with extra-legal methods, forced alienation' (Luna, 1999: 701) and, indeed, racism. As Guadalupe T. Luna observes:
Chicanas/os confronted a hierarchy of laws that sought to exclude them from assimilating within the mainstream culture. Stereotypes targeted them on the basis of their race by those seeking to benefit from that forced exclusion. Building from these myths, facilitated a legal culture that directly disallowed them the full attributes of citizenship status. (Luna, 1999: 701) Moreover, media coverage of the bloody aftermath of the California Land Act of 1851 was replete with images of 'violent Mexican bandits' and 'dangerous land robbers' (Munoz et al., 1998) . PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY 6(1) 
Racialized images in the hegemonic media
The contemporary American media serves as a disciplinary mechanism for keeping such racialized myths alive. Newspapers, television, and cinema have served as 'principal purveyors of racist images, constructing and institutionalizing stereotypes that have preserved the status quo whereby members of the dominant group stay on top while all others have been forced to linger at the bottom' (Castro, 1998: 141) . In the context of crime, the media has created the illusion of black and Latino/a criminality at the same time that it has created the illusion of white innocence. 6 While the evidence of racial and ethnic bias in the media is well documented, such stereotypical overrepresentations tell us less about how they are made hegemonic. Beyond simple racial binaries, we argue that a historically situated set of narratives represented chiefly by the 'threatening alien' elucidates the taken-for-granted character of jurors' stories of their death sentencing decisions. In other words, jurors' narratives may 'work as a form of shorthand, functioning effectively even when their content was and is not explicitly spelled out' (Lubiano, 1992: 331) .
The ethnic shorthand of the 'threatening alien' closely parallels an ever more hostile, anti-immigration rhetoric in US border-states in the late 20th century; a rhetoric manifested in the acts of hate-induced violence by private citizens (e.g., Moran, 1997) and through the passage of federal and state laws that have a discriminatory impact on all immigrants. Despite the fact that vast majority of Latino/as in the US are legal immigrants (e.g., Moran, 1997) , recent laws such as California's Proposition 187 require providers of public social services to deny services to anyone whom the service provider determines or 'reasonably suspects' is 'an alien in the United States in violation of the federal law.' . . . Finally, Proposition 187 aims to exclude undocumented children from both public elementary and secondary schools as well as public postsecondary institutions. (Garcia, 1995: 131) Moreover, in 1996 anti-immigrant legislation was passed at the federal level in the form of the Welfare Reform Act which goes beyond Proposition 187 in that it excludes legal immigrants from nearly all public programs.
The racializing effects of proposition 187
Politicians such as former California Governor Pete Wilson capitalized on Proposition 187 to mobilize white racialized fears of crime during the 1994 campaign for governor. In one such televised advertisement used by the Wilson campaign, immigrants were shown grouped along the California-Mexico border with the voice-over, 'They Keep coming.' Representing Latino/as as criminal aliens and thus whites as law-abiding and innocent, Proposition 187 was yet another powerful example of US law-making as part of a broader 'White Supremacy Story' (Steiner, 2001) .
Proposition 187 served also as a powerful catalyst for a revitalized assimilationism in California and the US more broadly. Both former Klu Klux Klan leader David Duke and presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan were two high profile voices in the media. 'There is nothing wrong with us sitting down and arguing that we are a European country' (Los Angeles Times, 1992) has become the rallying cry for English-Only and other anti-immigration iniatives in the US ever since:
FLEURY-STEINER AND ARGOTHY Lethal 'borders'
The calls for curbing undocumented immigration are concurrent with the rhetoric that programs and services such as bilingual education result in the Balkanization of America. Many who espouse this position also support an end or a severe cutback to legal immigration as well. These groups are strong proponents of an assimilationist perspective, which would effectively eliminate any display of the immigrant's culture once in the United States. (Garcia, 1995: 138) 
'BORDER' IN THE COURT
The assimilationist focus on 'illegals' has been conflated with that of the lawless criminal providing greater meaning, in effect, to a 'border' metaphor for representing Latino/as as threatening aliens. In this way, deportation, as the ultimate assimilationist threat (e.g., 'They keep coming'), can be seen as reinforcing the prevailing racialization of Latino/a Americans. As Alfredo Mirandé (1987) 
observes in Gringo Justice:
It is my contention that the 'border experience' should occupy a central role in any conceptualization of the Latino experience, for there is a sense in which Latinos, try as they may, cannot divorce themselves from their Mexican roots. Despite efforts to merge into the melting pot by establishing themselves as 'Mexican Americans', 'Americans of Mexican descent', or just plain 'Americans', the United States has been reluctant to incorporate them . . . to many Americans they some how remained 'Mexican' or 'foreign'. (1987: 222) To shed light on jurors' stories of their sentencing decisions in capital cases involving Latino 7 defendants, we proceed in two steps: (1) We focus on how Latino/a American defendants are racialized in respondents' stories of the trial; and (2) We focus more explicitly on how former jurors construct a Latino defendant's character in making the life or death decision.
THE DATA
Jurors' stories come from the Capital Jury Project (CJP), a national study of jury discretion in death penalty cases. The present analysis draws on 35 jurors' stories from some 14 capital cases in Texas and California in which a Latino defendant was sentenced to death. Table 1 provides a demographic picture of the jurors who served on these cases.
The survey instrument used open-ended questions that invited jurors to expound in their own words about various issues including 'Their own impressions of the defendant' and 'How the jury arrived at its punishment decision.' 8 While such questions did not explicitly focus on the influence of race on jurors' sentencing decisions they did prove crucial to the foregoing analysis. The death sentence of Victor Saldano, a Latino from Texas, as the above quotes attest, added fuel to an already building blaze of national criticism of America's death penalty. 9 The Saldano case again revealed -as it did in the case of Warren McCleskey 13 years earlier (McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987) -the haunting realities of institutionalized racial discrimination in capital sentencing trials. Arguing that disproportionate Latino crime rates in America's premier killing state demonstrated that Saldano's ethnicity was, in effect, predictive of his future dangerousness (Nelson, 2000) , Walter Quijano, a psychologist and prosecutorial witness, demonstrated Texas's unabashed commitment to racialized death sentencing. At the same time, the aftermath of the Saldano case also demonstrated the willingness of Texas elites such as then Governor Bush and Attorney General Cornyn to both defend the killing state and to deny that it is racialized (e.g. 'I think the system is working'). The Saldano case helps to illustrate the disproportionate presence of, and thus unique problems concerning, Latino defendants in Texas's death sentencing protocol. In this study, we examine jurors from both Texas and California. We focus on Texas because it has executed more Latino defendants than any other US state (Death Penalty Information Center, 2002) . On the other hand, we justify our focus on California because it has more Latinos currently awaiting execution (n = 119) than any other US state, including Texas (Death Penalty Information Center, 2002). 
METHODOLOGY
Our methodological focus (presented in more detail in Fleury-Steiner (2002) ) proceeded in two interrelated steps. First, jurors' verbatim responses were transcribed and then computerized. Next, we went through the texts of jurors' responses coding striking features that we marked for subsequent analysis. To better orient ourselves to any ambiguities in the transcriptions, we, whenever possible, went back to the tape recordings. Through numerous rounds of retranscribing and revising, we were able to clarify our interpretations of jurors' stories. Moreover, we ultimately were able to make the difficult decision of how to determine 'where a narrative begins and ends' (Riessman, 1993: 58) .
In sum, our methodological approach to the analysis began with identifying 'what' jurors were saying in the context of their decisions. Expanding beyond a literal interpretation of what was on the page, we began to notice consistencies in the way jurors' made sense in their stories, including the taken for granted normative grammars of both speaker and listener. By privileging the 'telling' of jurors' stories, we were able to make subsequent analytical interpretations. Indeed, the more we returned to the data, the more we began to connect the particularities of jurors' stories to broader sociocultural interpretations.
Analytical focus
Our interests in LatCrit theory 10 played a central role in guiding our analysis. From this perspective, we investigated jurors' responses for evidence that 'were constructed over time and transformed to fit the requirements of maintaining the present terms of the U.S. political economy' (Lubiano, 1992: 332) . Specifically, we inspected responses for the ways jurors in Latino defendant death cases referred to the defendant's or the family of the defendant's appearance and courtroom behavior. When exploring their responses we asked ourselves: How does this juror draw on cultural understandings of Latino identity in describing their punishment decisions? 11 However, in the proceeding analysis we use the term discipline and not 'cultural understandings' or 'stereotypes' when presenting our findings. We use this terminology because we, like Foucault, believe that these discourses are indicative of the institutional, and thus taken-for-granted or hegemonic character of death sentencing decisions in these cases. In other words, we believe these responses demonstrate how the jury operates as state sanctioned system and thus not merely abstract rhetoric regarding the punishment of Latino defendants.
JURORS' RACIALIZED DISCIPLINE IN LATINO DEFENDANT CASES
Jurors' racialized discipline to punish in Latino defendant death cases is manifest in three often interrelated narratives: 'colorblindness', 'ethnic threat', and 'ethnic deceit'. In short, jurors in these cases, like jurors in African-American death cases (e.g., FleurySteiner, 2002 ) speak in ways that reflect a sense of ethnic superiority and thus Latino/a American inferiority. A 'master' narrative that is institutionalized in the public sphere, as Teun van Dijk writes:
[I]f racism is reproduced through discourse and communication we may expect this also to be the case for stories and storytelling-in informal everyday conversation, in institutional storytelling, in the stories of novels and movies, as well as in the special 'stories' communicated by the mass media in the form of news reports '. (van Dijk, 1988: 123) PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY 6(1) And we might also expect the stories of jurors in death penalty cases involving Latino defendants to reveal how racism is institutionalized in death penalty cases as penal discipline.
The discipline of colorblindness
In the US, the belief in a 'colorblind' society typically brings to mind anti-affirmative action discourse; a discourse that denies the influence of racism on American inequality and instead centers around 'the distribution of social responsibilities and benefits on merit alone' (Bell, 1995: 133) . However, sociologists have more recently demonstrated how colorblindness has spilled over into a broader and taken-for-granted belief that denies the influence of racism in American society altogether:
Not surprisingly, national surveys indicate that today a majority of white Americans see equality of opportunity as the societal reality. They more or less agree with the elite view. Included in this perspective is the idea that discrimination is no longer widespread and that black Americans who complain of it are paranoid or confused. (Feagin, 2000: 123) Colorblindness has also been linked to punitive attitudes (Beckett, 1997: 85) . It is our contention here that beyond abstract attitudes, such a denial of racism is institutionalized into the capital sentencing process. As a pervasive form of racialized discipline, colorblindness is situated into many aspects of the jurors' sentencing trial experiences. Colorblindness disciplines the ways jurors evaluate witnesses, deliberate with other jurors, and justify their decisions to impose the death sentence.
'Prone to this type of behavior'
The controversial case of Victor Saldano, as we previously discussed, revealed that a defendant's ethnicity may be at issue in Texas death penalty cases. While experts such as Walter Quijano are typically employed to bolster the state's case, the defense may also employ similar experts in an attempt to mitigate the defendant's conduct. Focusing on Latino Americans' 'cultural propensity' for violence, such defense experts may try to, in effect, present this claim as a form of 'ethnic excuse'. Not surprisingly, this testimony may not persuade 'colorblind' jurors to spare the Latino defendant's life. As the following exchange with a California juror illustrates:
Interviewer:
Did you find the testimony of any of the witnesses for the prosecution or the defense hard to believe? Juror:
Yes, for the defense. There was a guy who was a history professor specializing in Spanish and Mexican nationalities. Juror:
. . . He was trying to explain because of the defendant's heritage he would be prone to this type of behavior. I didn't really buy that.
[And] he got chewed up by the prosecution. It was just one of those things, I don't know, he 'had' to kill, but it was something like that (CAJ1).
Perhaps the desperation to save a client's life explains the futility of the defense's strategy in this case. However, it may also reveal something about the failure of capital defense attorneys in California to consider the possibility of creating a colorblind backlash towards such testimony on the jury. Moreover, in a state with as contentious a identitydriven political climate as California, this example reveals both the gross incompetence FLEURY-STEINER AND ARGOTHY Lethal 'borders' of many capital defense attorneys (e.g. Mello, 1998) . It also reveals how the nature of the death penalty as a literally 'all or nothing' institution fosters, or at least may persuade, desperate capital defense attorneys to introduce such ethnocentric (and decidedly noncolorblind) evidence into a sentencing trial in the first place.
'If he could condemn someone Hispanic'
The colorblind discipline to punish may also reveal itself in complex ways in the jury's sentencing deliberations. In the proceeding case, a white juror voices a sense of sympathy for a Latino juror charged with having to sentence 'one of their own'. At the same time, this white juror fails to investigate the roots of this Latino juror's reluctance. While playing the racial sympathy card is certainly contrary to colorblind discipline in its purest sense, the fact that this juror simply writes off the matter as ultimately 'not having any effect' on the jury's decision to impose the death sentence is striking in this account:
There were never any major points of disagreement. We started out in a very disorganized manner just talking about how the penalty phase had been conducted. . . This is my opinion, but I don't think people were ready to deal with that decision yet. I made up my mind before the others. . . It was at this point jurors started focusing. At the vote it was only one juror who was undecided for about fifteen minutes. One of the jurors was Hispanic and his thing was deciding if he could condemn someone Hispanic. He decided that it shouldn't have any effect.
However, this respondent never goes onto explain what exactly the Latino juror's 'thing'
was. Yet that he was 'Hispanic' is useful in understanding how this respondent describes how the jury achieved consensus on a death sentence. Indeed, one interpretation of this account is that 'even those who are not 'colorblind' eventually decided that ethnicity shouldn't have any effect' are acting incorrectly. In other words, even if the Latino juror's 'thing' may have, for example, concerned the selective prosecution of minorities as capital murderers (for a review of the empirical evidence supporting this observation see Baldus et al., 1998) , such 'delays' need not be addressed.
In short, such a subversive tale is likely to be institutionally foreclosed in Latino death cases as information that deviates from a taken-for-granted colorblindness; a discipline that is ever more accepted as 'the way it is' in the US more broadly (e.g. Feagin, 2000) . In other words, it is what jurors as official representatives of the state -like other state officials such as Texas Attorney General John Cornyn (Nelson, 2000) -do not say that may be most critical in understanding how colorblindness is manifest as penal discipline in these cases. 12 Indeed, the difficult reality of being an ethnic minority juror on a jury that denies the existence of a racist institution -even if such a denial is contrary to the empirical evidence that convincingly demonstrates otherwise (e.g. Baldus et al., 1998) -is, in a word, a non-issue in this juror's story. The discipline of colorblindness washes away the very real concerns of a juror who happens to be Latino.
'We were all different, but we believed the same the thing'
In other cases, Latino jurors may actually have a voice on the jury. To shed light on this albeit rare instance, we turn interviews conducted with two respondents on a Latinomajority jury in a Texas case:
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Interviewer:
Why didn't the jury talk a lot? Juror:
I think it was the backgrounds. . . We all had, we were all real different. One of the guys didn't work, the other man was retired and me, I was only one that had a job so I was like, we didn't have anything in common to really talk other then the case. . . I mean when it was time to decide punishment we all believed the same thing.
'Believing the same thing', reveals a strikingly racialized character in a second Latino juror's account of the jury's decision:
There was this other lady who said he deserved another chance, she felt like race was a big factor. She said as a Latina she felt part of a lynch mob. She was very upset voting for the death sentence. . . But I disagreed with her, this guy was a dangerous hombre, a real desperado.
Perhaps analogous to a dynamic similar to Howarth's (1994 Howarth's ( : 1363 hard-line female respondent (e.g. 'It isn't that [they're] too tender-hearted; [they're] chicken shit') -only in this case race rather than gender dominates -this male, Latino juror represents the defendant in an expressly racially stereotypical way. While we are unsure if 'hombre' is a term this juror would use if the defendant were not Latino, we can infer from his response how unstable racial categories are and thus how pervasive the racialized discipline of colorblindness is in Latino death cases -indeed one might have assumed that this juror was 'male' and 'white'. Thus, the Latino man employs the time-tested racial stereotype of the 'Latino bandit' to describe this 'dangerous hombre' he, but not the Latina woman, mobilized in his decision to impose death.
The discipline of racial threat
The belief in 'dangerous hombres' may itself play a role in capital sentencing jurors' decisions to impose the death sentence. As we discussed previously, this image has a longstanding and stubborn cultural life in the US (e.g., Castro, 1998; Garcia, 1995; Luna, 1999; MirandÈ, 1987) . However, to understand how racial threat is institutionalized as penal discipline in capital cases one must be attentive to the various situations during the trial that jurors choose to emphasize.
'The Hispanics looked hard'
The discipline of racial threat in Latino defendant death cases is often activated in subtle ways. Indeed, the gestures and non-verbal exchanges between jurors, judges, and perhaps even the Latino defendant's family may confirm for jurors what they already know about 'threatening Latinos'. Consider a Texas juror's description of the predominantly Latino courtroom's reaction to a case in which she sentenced a Latino defendant to death for murdering a white victim:
I think the Hispanics were really, really together. And I don't know if they were relatives of his, I don't know, but they looked hard. None of them got up and witnessed on his behalf except his mother pled for us not to give the death sentence. When it happened, I mean, all the big husky people that were in the audience stared towards him and stared towards us.
What is interesting in this jurors' account -and, what we argue, is indicative of the discipline of racial threat in Latino defendant death cases -is how this juror finds it FLEURY-STEINER AND ARGOTHY Lethal 'borders' necessary to mention ethnicity at all. By denying the defendant his individualityindeed, by locating the defendant among the 'hard looking Hispanic' group -this juror makes sense of who she has been enlisted by the state to punish. Lastly, calling attention to ethnic solidarity, 'the Hispanics were really, really together', seems useful to this juror as a discursive device for distancing herself from 'them'. In other words, it seems to be an attempt on her part to minimize the jury's responsibility for the decision to impose the death sentence on 'one of them'.
'But how do you read this?'
Next, this respondent goes onto describe in more detail the defendant's reactions to receiving the death sentence:
This juror's questioning reveals an acute sensitivity she has towards the Latino defendant's manner and appearance in court. Indeed, if her questioning is suggestive of such a visual fixation on 'the other', then it is not surprising that she concludes her story by recalling a sequence of events that provide her further justification and hence discipline for making the death sentencing decision:
I felt definitely, if he could threaten a guy that was on the stand in front of everybody, and I know they (emphasis added) look like that. The lady that was the judge, I know she saw it because she was like looking at us and looking back at him. And you can read it in her eyes, 'Did you all see that?'
The above account speaks for itself. Describing both images of racial threat and feelings of paternalism, this respondent's phrase 'I know they look like that' while obvious a stereotype suggests a form of discursive back pedaling on this respondent's part. Indeed, such a phrase is similar to the claim, 'I'm not racist, I have many friends who are black', heard in contemporary white racial discourse of African-Americans (e.g. Feagin, 2000) . Perhaps most interestingly, is, additionally, this juror's justification for her interpretation of the 'threatening Hispanic' by recalling the judge's reaction, and, indeed, by the way she chooses to describe these events through the judge's voice: 'Did you all see that?' The 'that' may be interpreted as the 'Threatening Hispanic who should be executed'. Indeed, taken to another level of interpretation, if he isn't, he may put 'respectable' people in danger.
The discipline of racial deceit
The image of the deceitful Latino who will do almost anything to sneak across the US border to take full advantage of welfare programs has been perhaps most vividly captured in the debate and subsequent aftermath of the passage of California's Proposition 187. The nativist politics of Proposition 187 had wide-spread discriminatory effects on Latinos in the state. As Ruben Garcia (2003: 522) cogently observes:
Following the passage of Proposition 187, there was a documented rise in discrimination against Latina/o immigrants and citizens based on their perceived (emphasis in original) immigration PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY 6(1) status. Latinas/os and immigrants were denied access to private businesses and were harassed on the streets. State and federal laws, however, only prohibit exclusion from public accommodations if motivated by race, national origin, or ancestry. Statements like 'go back where you came from' do not directly imply a specific race or national origin animus except with reference to the target of the speech. Similarly, being asked for a green card was a common act in California after the passage of Proposition 187.
The theme of the 'deceitful alien' is situated as penal discipline in capital sentencing trials. When jurors describe their decisions to impose the death sentence on a Latino defendant the discipline of racial deceit may be activated at various points in the trial process, including when a Latino defendant who happens not to speak English testifies.
'He was just trying to make more of a hassle or something'
A language 'border' became critical for how California capital jurors made sense of 'who' the defendant is. Similar to the racially-coded and obviously derogatory statement 'go back to where you came from' heard in California after the passage of Proposition 187, a Latino defendant's testimony leads a juror to declare him 'untrustworthy' and 'lazy' -to declare him as a 'Hispanic' who 'spoke Spanish' to try to 'pull one over on us':
You got the impression he was trying to get you to believe that he wasn't even around or even remotely involved. He was just a guy, generally nice guy who just happened to get unfairly picked on. Yeah, I remember right when they were getting ready to, you know, he was on the stand, the prosecutor was kinda reading him into, he got him right where he was supposed to. You know, he was supposed to go over to the bank machine and rob the guy, and I think right about then we took a break for lunch and he happened to get sick for the rest of the afternoon.
[It] seemed kind of suspicious. . . And then . . . every time they got into some kind of a tricky spot he'd start speaking in Spanish instead of English, and we'd have to go to an interpreter. We knew he could speak English well enough, he was just trying to make more of a hassle or something.
The discipline of racial deceit is revealed in this juror's account. The phrase 'happened to get sick', while of little interpretive significance in its own right, seems to enable this juror to foreshadow the defendant's 'otherness'. Indeed, this 'suspicious' 'guy' when in 'a tricky spot' would then 'start speaking Spanish instead of English'. Articulating both 'suspiciousness' and 'speaking Spanish' in the construction of the Latino defendant as other becomes a critical means for assessing this defendant during the sentencing trial. Moreover, this respondent states, in addition to being suspicious, the defendant was a 'hassle or something'. 'Something', indeed 'not speaking English', more than the defendant's happening 'to get sick' suggests that in the end this defendant -like the 'alien' immigrants in Governor Pete Wilson campaign advertisement (e.g. Garcia 2003; Garcia 1995) -had 'crossed' the majority's 'border' of English only supremacy.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary anti-immigration and 'tough-on-crime' narratives of the 'threatening alien' have direct implications for understanding how modern death sentencing decisions are racialized. 13 While racial inequity in the criminal justice process may 'not be surprising' 14 in a historically racist society such as the US, we argue that the decision FLEURY-STEINER AND ARGOTHY Lethal 'borders'
to impose the death sentence itself is mobilized as a broader, historically situated form of racialized discipline. Judging a defendant they know nothing or very little about, former white and Latino capital jurors import such a racialized discourse from the outside in. Erecting a racial binary -indeed, a 'border' that allows them to articulate their decisions to impose the death sentence as an evaluation of how the defendant does not 'live up to their standards' -capital jurors as 'penal activists' impose the death sentence on a Latino defendant as part of a broader assimilationist-infused strategy for doing punishment. The racialization of crime and criminals in the media and in political discourse has been widely demonstrated (for a recent review see Beckett, 1997 ). Yet it is not until we look within the penal apparatus itself that we see how the 'coloring' of Latino/a Americans in contemporary popular and political discourse is inextricably bound up in penal practice as taken-for-granted. As other studies have demonstrated in the context of lawmaking in the War on Drugs (Steiner, 2001 ) and policing practices in Britain (Bourne, 2001) , we must do more as punishment and society scholars than focus on the state's racist endgame -indeed, on what Foucault (2002: 258) called the 'lies of power'. If we are to advance our knowledge of the penal process in action, future research must pay greater attention to how historically situated hegemonic narratives (Ewick and Silbey, 1995) permeate the penal apparatus in other sites. Only in this way can we move beyond restating 'obvious' inequities in punishment outcomes to presenting richer, culturally-centered analyses of how such practices are racialized in the present.
Notes
1 Throughout this article, we use the term Latino/a American rather than Hispanic, in identifying the various Latin American groups. As Suzanne Oboler (1995: 7-8) observes, 'the term Latino has since been increasingly adopted, primarily in urban areas in which various Latin American national-origin groups are represented.' 2 Foucault is not suggesting that racism was invented at the point in which disciplinary and regulatory techniques developed. Rather he is suggesting that racism functioned elsewhere and not as a mechanism of power inscribed in the State. 3 In many respects Foucault's observation foreshadowed his later work on 'governmentality'. Here, Foucault explicitly presents a triangulated model of society in which law, discipline, and government are mutually dependent: 'in reality we have a triangle: sovereignty-discipline-government' (Foucault, 1980: 19) . 4 'Racialization is an ideological process, an historically specific one. Racial ideology is constructed from pre-existing conceptual (or, if one prefers, "discursive") elements and emerges from the struggles of competing political projects and ideas seeking to articulate similar elements differently' (Omi and Winant, 1986: 64) . 5 The cultural approach to studying the death penalty in the US is elucidated in Sarat's (2001) (Sarat, 2001: 14) . 6 Thus, Robert Elias (1994) , in his analysis of more than 35 years of crime coverage in American news magazines, observes:
Blacks and other non-white minorities were described and pictured in the newsweeklies crime coverage most frequently even though these groups do not commit the majority of crimes. . . . In contrast, the newsweeklies described and pictured victims mostly as white people. What emerges from my study is a pattern of discrimination in which criminals are conceptualized as [people of color] and crime as the violence they do to whites. (Elias, 1994: 5) 7 All 35 jurors' stories we investigated involved male, Latino defendants. 8 For more information on the CJP methodology See Bowers (1995) . 9 In 29 January 2000, nearly 11 months after a tenth man from Illinois, Anthony Porter, was freed from death row Governor Ryan declared:
I can't support a system which, in its administration, has proven to be so fraught with error and has come so close to the ultimate nightmare: the state's taking of innocent life. . . . (Chambers, 2000: 1) With that, Ryan's decree halted all pending and future capital cases in Illinois at the same time that it ignited the national death penalty debate anew. 10 'At a related level, we must ask ourselves what is "critical" about the LatCrit project?
I believe the answer has three components. First, LatCrit is a critical scholarship in refusing to see the law as internally consistent and fundamentally just. We realize the law can be used to further just ends, but we are far from accepting this as inevitable. The second component of the "critical" in LatCrit may be openness to non-traditional legal scholarship. We intend to draw frequently on work from disciplines other than law, to transgress disciplinary boundaries, and to take up potentially empowering methods such as the narrative form and oral history. A related critical element is that LatCrit scholars see their agenda as both beyond law and beyond Latino interests. We support legal change as part of a broader agenda of social and political transformation. We seek the betterment of society for many who are disenfranchised and self-consciously seek coalitions with other racial minorities, white progressives, poor and working people of all races, and subordinated peoples world-wide'. (Gomez, 1998: 191) 11 In this way, LatCrit theory informed our analysis by placing Latino/as at the center of our analysis thereby 'challenging the traditional silence about the Latino experience with the American legal system' (Gomez, 1998: 190) . 12 The privileging of one narrative over another in jurors' responses may simply be a reflection exposure to a biased US media:
Newspapers, radio programs, and television networks, stations, and programs, need not deliberately contrive to make absent certain narratives by presenting others; it is unnecessary that the work of (or on behalf of ) power go on via conspiratorial agreement or arrangement. Such work goes on because the media, along with other public and private entities . . . constantly make available particular narratives and not others. In turn, such consistently reinforced presences reproduce the world in particular ways: what we see becomes what we 'get', what we believe. (Lubiano, 1992: 330) 13 While the state remains a 'muffled' voice in such jurors' stories, we must not forget that it is the state that is ultimately responsible for making racist death sentencing FLEURY-STEINER AND ARGOTHY Lethal 'borders' legitimate. Indeed, it is the state that requires such lay representatives to serve on its behalf. And even more importantly, it is the state that ultimately carries out executions. 14 In the academy, many, when reflecting on evidence of egregious racial biases in the American criminal justice system, qualify their remarks with words like 'obviously' or phrases such as 'that is not surprising' without any theoretical clarification. One negative consequence for the (disproportionately white) audience, however, is that they are left to their own devices to interpret and thus may come to believe such inequities are an 'inevitability' or worse they may engage in a pervasive blaming of the victim.
